Abstract-With an increasing number of wireless devices and access technologies available, users will be able to access their Personal Distributed Environment of services and data conveniently in a wide variety of ways. Unfortunately, this flexibility comes at a cost -higher security risks and vulnerabilities. The traditional association with a network provider may not exist, replaced by a far more nebulous association with a number of unknown entities, network nodes and service providers. These ad hoc relationships require a notion of trust, which presents great difficulties in a dynamic wireless environment. This paper presents a formal trust architecture to address these issues, with the focus on aspects of trust policy formation and its evolution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The view of the next generation has evolved from the single multi-mode 'super-terminal', to one where users access services through a wide variety of different terminals optimised for their application. These terminals, services and data that the user will access, form the user's "Personal Distributed Environment" (PDE) [1] . The PDE is a dynamic entity, changing not only with the services, but also with the location and access technology. Locally within a PDE, the different terminals that a user has available, such as cell phone, laptop, media player, etc., are likely to communicate by means of one or a combination of long and/or short range wireless technologies. Although the PDE concept generates business opportunities for both the service providers and the network operators, it has also instigated trust issues between these parties and the PDE users. With distributed access to data, perhaps using shared terminals such as displays in an Internet café, the risks of unauthorised access to data or spoofing of the user are greatly increased.
Over the years, several trust management systems have been introduced. Some are developed to solve the trust issues with specific focus on general authorisation [2] , [3] while others have concentrated on authentication [4] , [5] and particular applications [6] , [7] . However, comparison between these approaches is difficult due to the breadth of these system specifications and the trust languages employed. The lack of precision inevitably introduces further doubts of their suitability to specify and express the security needs both effectively and intelligently to a dynamically changing environment, with devices entering and leaving the PDE.
The ability to specify trust in a commonly understood format across domains is essential, as without this, users will not be able to trust that services offered from the 3rd parties are safe. The frequent need to physically split and merge several different PDE sub-networks will also make the trust problem more complex, as each different sub-network will have its own security mechanisms (based, for example, on the access network), and its own identity server process.
This paper considers the trust requirements and issues and how several policies can be generated and managed via a suitable specification language for a PDE scenario. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section II, a formal definition of trust notion is provided. In Section III, a representation of trust relationship between entities is introduced. Section IV details how the trust policies can be derived using an example. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. DEFINITION OF TRUST
In this article, we define PDE trust as:
The belief or willingness to believe an entity based on its competence (e.g. goodness, strength, ability) and behaviour within a specific context at a given time.
The competences refer to the performance capabilities such as interpreting the user requirements correctly or executing the policy rules properly while behaviours refer to the possibilities of colluding and lying.
III. REPRESENTATION OF TRUST RELATIONSHIPS Fig.1 presents an overall fundamental structure for explicit expressions of trust relations between the entities and how the various trust policies can be created in the PDE context, with the intention of sustaining trust for:
• Entities that wish to join the PDE, • Entities that want to establish a PDE-internal or/and PDEexternal relationship(s) with other entities, and • Entities that want to be assured of a device's performance and the performance of the PDE's execution system. From Fig.1 party devices, service providers, content providers, access providers and transport providers. The advantages of having these separate domains are that:
• It allows issues to be addressed in each zone independently.
• The security functions can be executed more aptly and less ambiguously as only the specified entity formats in each domain can have the access rights to enquire for a security procedure. The recommended access formats are agent, execution environment, application, content (e.g.video), data and message.
• It supports secure group communication and enables interoperability that is not restricted by local security policies. The crucial element in the framework is the "trust engine" which falls in between the PDE and the Service domains. Different relevant types of trust requirements can be identified and classified in this region. The trust engine depicts a formalism for expressing requirements for trust relations and a contemplation for identification of several security constraints in developing a trust policy. The trust information provided in the trust engine is time dependent and, in general, it is also varying rapidly in order to give a reliable state of information/condition.
Six key criteria, that are considered for expressing the trust needs as input to the procedures for handling requests in the policy expression and exchange are:
• The Trust Reputation [8] , [9] anticipates that trust establishment can no longer rely solely in the outcome of the executed security mechanisms/techniques, which include cryptographic algorithms and access control methods. This is because these mechanisms/techniques do not say much about the broader notion of an entity's trustworthiness. If direct social cues are not available, the reputation (or trust value) can still be based on indirect observations or evidence from the auditing service and the intrusion detection system. The other reason for having these trust evaluators is to guard against any indirect risk contact that could be inherited, especially from a presumably honest and authenticated entity. For instance, a PDE user's mobile phone may have downloaded content that is infected with virus and passed it on to a laptop without knowing it, or their mobile phone may have been accidentally corrupted by the messages when used by a Bluetooth-enabled PDA seeking its aid to send messages to a remote controller via infra-red. Hence, the trust evaluator like Risk Assessment which serves to assess the amount of risk that an entity will incur to its corresponding entities, is useful. However, these eight trust evaluators will not totally remove all the anticipated risks as their roles are to assist the users to decide on an option with the least level of perceived risk.
• The Pre-assigned Trust Level from user, whereby flexibility is required in both the trust allocation and mapping.
• The Performance Capability refers to the ability to deliver the promised services or tasks. For example, what a PDE user requires from his PDE system is whether his PDE system is faithfully executing the instructions that are given to it.
• The Trusting Period which is difficult to define quant-itatively, but can have defined Pre-Trust, Mid-Trust and Post-Trust periods. The latter requires an entity to also satisfy the security rules set by both the Pre and MidTrust periods before it can be granted the rights to access and release confidential resources and information such as user's profile, location details and monetary information.
• The current Security Status shows the security level that an entity has obtained. This component places an effect on the amount of access rights (i.e. trusting rights) which will be granted to an entity. • The Types of Access which ties with the types of required membership.
Though the proposed criteria above will influence the trust deployment in a relationship in every respect, it has nevertheless facilitated a consistent view of trust to be deployed in the PDE context. As for setting up a dynamic trust policy, the required criteria are:
• To be effective in exchanging information on which trust decisions may be based, agreed Protocols and Message are also necessary.
• The Security Policy/Services refers to the existing policies/services such as privacy policy and authorisation function that can be re-used and integrated as part of the new trust policy.
• The Security Mechanisms such as digital signature and encryption assure security functions (e.g. integrity & confidentiality) have the capability of enforcing various service qualities between the end-users. The amount of security mechanisms to be employed in a service also rely on how important this sevice is and its implication.
• The Bindings Security is to tie the security characteristics from the Security Mechanisms to the agreed Protocols and Message.
• The Security Token and Exchange Service provides a set of rules to the trust engine to create and exchange an entity's characteristics such as name, group and capability. • Policy expression & exchange is where an ideal policy language is identified and is used to express the capabilities or any strong constraints of the PDE security. It also facilitates service requestors and providers to exchange dynamically security (among other) policy information in order to establish a negotiated security context between them.
Unlike the OSGI's Web Services (WS)-Trust Specifications [10] , the PDE's trust architecture anticipates that a trusting relationship should not be established by just using trusted proxies. Evaluation of trust and interrelationships between the outcome of the security execution and the access rights are also vital to building a trusting relationship. If not, issues may arise when a relationship is built with no clear understanding on the referring or requiring trust component. In addition, it appears that WS-Trust Specifications may apply only to the WS security standard for securing web services at the message layer.
IV. A PDE SCENARIO
A PDE user, Bob, wants to make use of his own PDA to update a program file in his home computer network while he is travelling to work. Through his PDA's search, two public members have responded. To invite one of the public members, Bob has to consider a few issues with the assumption that both the service cost and the transmission speed are not critical factors.
A. Consideration Issues
To Bob, his prime trust concerns when selecting a foreign device comprise of:
1) How can I trust the foreign device or the offered service?:
• Does this foreign device have sufficient of security protection and features? • Will it deliver the promised service at the end of the day?
• Did this foreign device hack any of my devices before?
• Did this foreign device pass any computing virus to my device? The listed concerns are relevant if Bob has any past experiences (either general or specific ones) with the foreign device and if there is any operation records of the foreign device from trusted sources. If this foreign device is new to Bob's PDE, the concerns addressed in Part 2) will be more appropriate and applicable.
2) How do I specify how much trust I should place in this external device?:
• Are my devices (i.e. my PDA and computer network) more vulnerable than others? • Can all my devices speak for me?
• Who are the owners of this external device and its service? • If the foreign device has no record, how many security mechanisms and functions are required for my complete trust? The aspects discussed above somehow rely on how much confidence Bob has on his PDA and his home network and whether the trust evaluator and the performance analyser can furnish an honourable assertion. On the other hand, if the public device holds a credential that is accredited by one of the PDE's Device Management Entities (DMEs) or Trusted Third Parties (TTPs), Bob may save some "worrying" times. Once Bob has decided whether he should completely or partially trust this foreign device, he can move on to determine the trust period and the amount of access rights that the foreign device can have with a bit of help below.
3) How much trust period and access rights are required in this transaction?:
• How important is this program file? exchange their security policy information. When Bob has fairly determined his trust criteria for this external device/ service, the trust engine can proceed to generate a trust policy.
B. Policy Implementation 1) Policy Specification Language:
We select a structured and widely adopted language, eXtensible Markup Language (XML), as our policy representation and implementation [11] . The main advantage of XML is that it is increasingly used to integrate applications and communicate between systems in many environments [12] , [13] .
2) The Derived Trust relationships: Presumably, Bob has derived two different trust relationships to be executed:
• Situation 1 (simple) -The external device is new and has no operation record. Bob's PDA and his home computer network have no record of any illegal intrusion or virus infection. The program file requires minimum amount of security services as it's already highly encrypted with a security technique. Bob specified his trust requirements as: -Foreign device needs to be authenticated first and then satisfy the security access rules to Mid-Trust Period. -Only then, membership with "forward program filename, "Program123" to home network Servername "KingKong" will be endorsed.
• However, before these expressions are converted into proper source codes, policy statements are required to capture information such as the elements of the trust reputation and the permission assignment to the local DMEs, PDA and PDE network. These include how these involved parties are related in terms of their roles and hierarchy arrangement. The examples are shown below: <!-A DTD file is created to capture the architectural elements of a PDE network -> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <pde> <assign date = "2004/04/04"></assign date><time>14:05</time> <!ELEMENT PDE hierarchy (RootDME,LocalDME,Device)> <!ELEMENT RootDME (ISP givenID,Root VID,Root other)> <!ELEMENT ISP givenID (#PCDATA)>
